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n December 2015, The Commission proposed to set up a European Border and Coast Guard 
(EBCG) as one of the key responses to the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’. The initiative intends to 
give Frontex, the EU’s current border agency, more competences, staff and equipment, and 
to rename it the EBCG. The new EBCG would work together with the member states’ national 
border and coast guard authorities.  
The European Council Conclusions of February 18th on Migration called for the negotiations 
of the proposal to be accelerated with a view to reaching a political agreement during the 
Dutch Presidency so that the new agency will be operational as soon as possible. The Justice 
and Home Affairs Council meets on Thursday, 25 February 2016 to discuss these proposals. 
Our forthcoming CEPS paper1 critically assesses this proposal against the background of 
Frontex responses at the external borders in 2015, namely the ‘Triton’ and ‘Poseidon’ Joint 
Operations and the ‘Hotspots’ systems in Italy and Greece. It asks whether the proposed 
EBCG will constitute a true European border and coast guard capable of addressing the 
needs on the ground. We contend that the EBCG would neither lead to a truly ‘European’ 
border and coast guard, nor would it address a glaring deficiency in the EU’s response to crisis 
throughout last year: the inadequate reception conditions and procedures for processing 
applications from asylum-seekers inside the EU.  
Key Findings 
First, the proposal builds on the current Frontex Regulation, revamping the Agency into a 
Frontex+ and assigning it more competences meant to address the shortcomings in the 
Agency’s current work: insufficient (human and equipment) capacities and a lack of 
cooperation by some member states.  
These new competences would include a ‘right to intervene’, entailing the sending of 
European border guard authorities from other member states to a common EU external border 
without needing to obtain the consent of the member state concerned. 
                                                   
1 Sergio Carrera and Leonhard den Hertog (forthcoming 2016), “A European Border and Coast Guard: 
What’s in a name?”, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 88, CEPS, Brussels. 
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Frontex has encountered difficulties in the past in calling up enough national border guards 
from member states to meet its needs. The EBCG proposal envisages more mandatory member 
state contributions to the agency “pools”, including a “rapid reserve pool” of EBCG Teams, 
consisting of a “standing corps” of a minimum of 1,500 national border guards to which 
member states “shall make available” 2-3% of their national border and coast guard officers. 
The EBCG would have the competence to place Liaison Officers in member states. 
Nonetheless, the EBCG does not establish an agency with its own ‘European’ border guards 
who would be responsible for ensure a constant and uniform application of EU law (the 
Schengen Borders Code) across all EU external borders.  
The EBCG would also depend on the active cooperation by concerned EU member states. The 
member state and the new agency would still need to agree on an operational plan and 
national officers and assistance would still be needed to be able to implement any form of 
operational cooperation. 
The legal basis of the EBCG proposal is sound, including when it comes to ‘the right to 
intervene’. Art. 77.1.d TFEU grants the power to the EU to adopt “any measure” necessary for 
gradual establishment of an integrated border management system for external borders. This 
provision could also be read in light of Art. 4.3 TEU, as it would strengthen member states’ 
compliance with the principle of sincere and loyal cooperation under EU borders law. 
It is of concern that the complaint mechanism envisaged by the EBCG proposal in cases of 
alleged fundamental rights violations does not ensure independence and therefore would not 
qualify as an effective remedy for individuals. This is particularly problematic when it comes 
to the envisaged new responsibilities on returning refugees to their home countries. 
Second, the 2015 refugee crisis exposed deficiencies in structural and administrative 
capacities across member states in complying with EU border and asylum standards.  
Without systematically addressing these deficiencies in domestic capacity, the EBCG proposal 
would add a reinforced Frontex in a working environment on the ground that is unable to take 
up and connect to the EBCG work.  
In September 2015, the European Commission launched 40 infringement proceedings against 
EU member states for incorrect transposition and implementation of common European 
asylum standards. These proceedings, however, should not be a simple ‘legal check’ of 
national transposition.  
Attention should be instead paid to the extent to which the conditions are present for effective 
and practical implementation of these EU legal standards. Particularly problematic in this 
regard are the profoundly inadequate first-reception conditions for asylum-seekers and the 
implementation of the Receptions Directive 2013/33. 
The 2015 responses have shown that the agency can coordinate Joint Operations and help set 
up ‘Hotspots’ in Italy and Greece. But without up-to-standard national reception and asylum 
systems in place on the ground, those intercepted and registered cannot be directed anywhere. 
Relocation of asylum-seekers proves to be particularly problematic under those circumstances. 
Third, the EBCG aims to re-position Frontex at centre stage for coordinating information 
exchange and operational cooperation between member state border authorities and other 
authorities with coast guard functions.  
In examining which authorities have ‘coast guard functions’, our paper finds that it varies 
from one member state to another – depending on the authority(ies) engaged in coast guard 
functions and responsible Ministry(ies). In several Mediterranean countries, e.g. Spain, 
Portugal, Italy and Malta, such authorities include military and/or para-military actors. These 
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are not the usual Schengen border authorities, which, according to the EU Schengen 
Catalogue, should be civilian in nature.  
The EBCG proposal aims at reinforcing Frontex’s points of entry into (non-Schengen) maritime 
border surveillance cooperation and information exchange, based on networks of authorities 
with coast guards ‘functions’. This development would raise questions as to how these actors 
and networks will comply with key EU rule of law standards governing borders, asylum and 
human rights while engaged in activities coordinated by the EBCG: who would be responsible 
in the event of incidents and fundamental rights violations? This question will be particularly 
pertinent in relation to search and rescue (SAR) operations at sea.  
An illustration of the accountability dilemma in involving military actors in migration-related 
matters is the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy operation called EUNAFVOR MED 
Sophia, which operates just south of JO Triton’s operational area.  
Particular attention should be paid to the way in which the modalities of cooperation between 
the EBCG agency and the European Fisheries Control Agency and the European Maritime 
Safety Agency will be delineated. Although more information exchange and operational 
cooperation amongst the different policy networks and actors are foreseen, it remains to be 
seen whether the long-standing tensions between the various national authorities performing 
border management functions will be overcome. 
Fourth, the EBCG initiative indicates a misguided EU policy priority focused on external 
border controls, return and cooperation with third countries as the ‘solutions’ to the refugee 
crisis.  
This focus comes at the expense of EU actions to address asylum, humanitarian and human 
rights challenges and opportunities to enhance EU institutional solidarity. It also prevents 
giving a strong priority to common policies which fight against intolerance, fear and 
xenophobia vis-á-vis against refugees and migrants. 
The presence of EASO (European Asylum Support Office) at the hotspots in Italy and Greece 
has been underwhelming. Only eight member-state experts have been sent in all of Italy, and 
12 member-state experts and one EASO staff member have been dispatched to Greece.  
We welcome the reference in the February 2016 European Council Conclusions on Migration 
(point 7.g) to the need to boost the capacity for the EU to provide humanitarian assistance 
internally. This assistance should go hand-to-hand with efforts to ensure EU institutional 
solidarity and the faithful observance of European standards within the scope of EU asylum 
law on reception.  
It is particularly in this latter domain that EASO could play a stronger role. Alongside any 
reinforcement of the Frontex mandate, a serious discussion is needed on boosting the role and 
competences of EASO in safeguarding access to reception and asylum across the Union and 
moving beyond the current EU Dublin system. 
 
